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A VIEW FROM THE BRIDGE: SOME OBSERVATIONS
ON AMPHIBIOUS TORT JURISDICTION
IN ADMIRALTY
By

THOMAS

A.

CLINGAN,

JR.t

Where o where is the New River in Virginia?
It made the jurisdiction of the admiraltee
Nice little river near the tops of the mountains,
Never saw a steamer and it wouldn't float a tugboat
Roosevelt wanted power for some Tennessee farmers,
So it made the jurisdiction of the admiraltee.
Anonymous ditty.

I.
INTRODUCTION

W

ITH THE PASSAGE of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Extension

Act of 1948,1 the Congress of the United States, yielding to a
steadily increasing pressure for legislative relief, negated an eightyyear old rule of maritime tort jurisdiction known as the "locality"
rule. This was the rule first announced by the Supreme Court in the
case of The Plymouth2 in 1865 when it held that a tort involving
damage done by a ship to a shore structure was outside admiralty
jurisdiction with regard to the right of the structure owner to bring
suit if the locus or consummation of the damage sued upon was on
the shore. The Court's theory was that if the tort occurred on the
shore, it must be the civil, or common law courts, and not the admiralty
who had cognizance.
The inequities created by this ruling are apparent, though just
how severe they are as compared with the increase in maritime operating costs engendered by a contrary position might well be a matter
for dispute.' Because admiralty had no jurisdiction over one side of
the controversy strange results were to be encountered. In a situation
t B.S., 1950, U.S. Coast Guard Academy; J.D., 1963, George Washington
University; Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University; member,
District of Columbia Bar.
1. Act of June 19, 1948, 62 Stat. 496, 46 U.S.C. § 740 (1958).
2. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1865).
3. The increased costs to be borne by industry because of judicially created
rules of liability and procedure are often the subject of debate. As an example, Mr.
Thomas E. Byrne, Jr., in a discussion on the seaworthiness doctrine before the
Admiralty and Maritime Law Committee of the Federal Bar Association on September 25, 1963, commented:
From 1946 to date, there has been an appreciable reduction in the American
Merchant Marine. According to TIMs magazine, the fleet decreased 41.9% in the
ten year period ending January 1, 1963. The overall cost of the extension of the
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where both parties might be to blame in the collision of a ship with
a bridge, for example, the shipowner might sue immediately in admiralty, taking advantage of the "both to blame" rule of comparative
negligence,4 or, if he preferred, he could wait until sued at common
law by the bridge owner and then assert the absolute defense of contributory negligence. In addition, in those cases where the ship was
under the control of a compulsory pilot at the time of collision, the
lack of jurisdiction over a subsequent action by the owner of the shore
structure rendered him completely remedyless. 5
It was to the practical solution of these and other such problems
that the 1948 Act was addressed. Its passage was not a hasty reaction
to various forms of political pressures, but became a fact only after
interested groups and individuals had resolved some serious doubts.
Because of the history of this Act, it has been selected as the focal
point for this discussion of the Supreme Court and its treatment of
admiralty tort jurisdiction.
By its terms the 1948 Act extended the jurisdiction of the admiralty
courts of the United States to include all cases involving "damage
or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable
water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land." By the simple reality of enactment the Congress
swept away the rule of The Plymouth, making clear that in its collective judgment it had not created a new cause of action but rather
directed the courts to exercise a jurisdiction that had always existed
but previously laid dormant. Stated differently,. the Congress had reseaworthiness doctrine to the industry is estimated to run as high as fifty million
dollars a year ...
Courts may change laws within some spheres, but there are certain basic
economic laws which even decisions of the United States Supreme Court cannot
change. A business which cannot operate profitably simply cannot operate.
Compare the following observation of Mr. Wilfred R. Lorry before that same group:
I suggest to you that we can take comfort and pride in the fact that our basic
federal policy, as exemplified by numerous Acts of Congress and an undeviating
flow of judicial decisions, has been to maintain the humanitarian doctrines typical
of the philosophies underlying the development of the maritime law. The validity

of the practice of spreading the loss suffered by maritime workers, and absorbing
it as a cost of industry, has been recognized in all phases of our commercial life,
and is indeed the basic precept initiating the insurance industry .... The impact
of the equitable principles of the maritime law in softening the harshness of
the common law is something which all right thinking minds should encourage.
4. E.g., The Catharine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1855).
5. The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868); Homer Ramsdell Transp. Co. v.
La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 182 U.S. 406 (1901).
6. The full text of that Act, as it pertains to the present problem, is:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall extend to
and include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a
vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be (lone
or consummated on land. In any such case suit may be brought in rem or in personam according to the principles of law and the rules of practice obtaining in cases
where the injury or damage has been done or consummated on navigable water.
The remainder of the Act deals with other problems and has been omitted.
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minded the courts that the jurisdictional Iclause of the Constitution 7
from which admiralty"cdurts drew their power was broader in scope
than the corresponding: clause of the judiciary acts,' and that the legislature was setting those courts free from previous misunderstandings
about constitutional, restrictions so that they might exercise beneficial
power in this particular area." The language of the judiciary act is
exactly the same as that used in the Constitution; thus the result of
the 1948 enactment would appear to be such as to give one meaning
to the words in one instance, and a different meaning in the other.
How can it be that two identical -sources of law can convey different
content? For the answer to that question, there is need for examination of constitutional history, tradition, and matters of policy.
' , .....
i II . '
SOME GROUNDWORK

11

THEORY

Before becoming, deeply involved with the specifics of the problem,
it would be well to pause and place the issues in perspective - at
least to the extent that it is necessary to consider constitutional
questions. First, and most likely foremost, the obligation to change
traditional concepts;§' i even sweep them away, if necessary to keep
pace with the demands of a metamorphic society must be recognized.
This responsibility is 'almost an absolute. To fail to accept its obligation on the excuse of infringement of legislative prerogative would be
remiss on the part ofi any court, admiralty or otherwise. Professor
Carl Brent Swisher ha's described the obligation in this manner:
If the dominant sentiment of the community as to 'what ought to
be' deviates away from previously accepted interpretations of the
Constitution, the judiciary will refrain from falling into line only
at its peril. He who witnesses changes in our conceptions of
rightness but nevertheless expects constitutional interpretations to
remain unchanged has much yet to learn about the character of
our institutions. 9
7. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
With regard to the reason for including both "admiralty" and "maritime" in the face
of apparent redundancy, see the observations of Mr. Justice Wayne in The Huntress,

12 Fed. Cas. 984, 989 (No. 6914) (D.C. Me. 1840).
8. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73. For the language of this statute, as
it bears upon the issue, see the text at page 466 infra.
9. SWISHER, THE GROWTH Olt CONSTITUTIONAL POWER IN THE UNITED STATES

17 (1946).
Also,
It is clear, then, that if we are to solve modern problems in terms of the Constitution someone must read new content into old language. Id. at 216.
And,
It [the Supreme Court] is, in a sense, as it has at
times been characterized,
something in the nature of a constitutional convention, yet it is a convention which
functions within the pattern and in terms of the principles of a constitution which
has already been established. Ibid.
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A second postulate is still the correlative of the first, however. It is
equally true that while obligations rest upon courts and legislatures
to respond to special stimuli, that responsibility cannot be exercised
in an arbitrary manner. There must be something more than a simple
need for relief. If Professor Swisher's conceptions of rightness become synonymous with expediency, the standards of statutory and
constitutional interpretation become arbitrary and empty phrases.
Whether the approach is general, or restricted to the narrow context
of admiralty, there is a line which still exists between that which is
and that which is not. In admiralty, perhaps more than in any other
area, there are inherent constitutional limitations 0 beyond which necessity cannot carry us without doing irreparable injury to the stability
of the law which, while not an idol, is (with apologies to Confucius)
one of the cements that holds our society together."
A scale is needed to balance the need for change in admiralty
law. The rich and very distinctive heritage of admiralty tradition
has been used to strike the balance between admiralty law and common
law for centuries, but this is not to say that equilibrium has always
been attained with precision. Rather, admiralty tradition must be
used in precise amounts and with the utmost care or the balance will
not be struck. Of equal importance with the accuracy of the scale
is the perceptiveness of the scale-reader. Unwanted parallax is easily
introduced.
With reference to the amphibious tort problem, it can be said at
the outset that the passage of the 1948 Act suggests a problem of fine
balancing. Judge Brown once observed that if the Congress had the
unlimited power of a British Parliament, there could be no question
of its ability to legislate on any matter of jurisdiction. At the same
time he recognized that the Supreme Court, and not the Congress,
must be the final arbiter of constitutional limitation. "It seems inevitable, therefore, that the Court must continue for an indefinite time
to grope among conflicting codes for the true definition of 'all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,' and that Congress, at best
can play only a minor part."" The Extension Act would suggest
10. The need for constitutional limits is seldom, if ever, denied. But in practice,
proclamations of judges and commentators espousing such limitations are rarely of
use to a pragmatist. Some simply beg the question. Consider: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
11. Confuscius believed that convention is the cement of society. He used the
term lito represent the whole complex of conventional and social usage. See generally,
CREL, CHINESE THOUGHT FROM CONFUCIUS TO MAO Tsi -TuNG (1960).
12. Brown, Jurisdiction of the Admiralty in Cases of Tort, 9 COLUM. L. REv. 1,

4 (1909).
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just the opposite. However, it would seem that to place the picture
in perspective it will be necessary to participate in a certain amount
of groping on our own. In addition to examining problems of constitutional limits, such investigation should help to analyze the practicality
as well as the desirability of the results achieved by this legislation.
To commence, then, let us examine whether the Congress, in announcing this previously untapped reservoir of constitutional power, gave
adequate consideration to the roots of admiralty jurisdiction, or, if
having examined them with appropriate vigor, gave proper weight
to what they found.
III.
THE EARLY TRADITION

As will be seen in discussions to follow, many courts rely heavily
upon maritime history as a source of justification for their particular
conceptions of the breadth of the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdictions. For that reason, this section is devoted to a brief recount
of salient features. Not surprisingly, our admiralty tradition draws
heavily upon the English, although there is much authority for the
principle that the substantive law of the sea is based upon that entire
body of maritime rules as has always been recognized by the major
seagoing communities.1" There would seem to be little justification,
however, for diluting the particular impact of English law, simply
because that nation may have drawn impetus in turn from the continent.14 It is now clear that our conceptions of jurisdiction are not
to be circumscribed by the narrow borders of early English tradition,
but that material is still relevant if only for the purpose of mood
setting.
Following in the continental tradition, English coastal towns
shared in the development of maritime law by establishing local courts
13. See, e.g., Fematt v. City of Los Angeles, 196 F. Supp. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1961),
and authorities cited therein; United States v. Matson Nav. Co., 201 F.2d 610 (9th
Cir. 1953). See generally, GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (1957).
14. In Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. 882 (1759), Lord Mansfield observed, at 887, that
the court was not restricted to English law because the "maritime law is not the law
of a particular country, but the general law of all nations." The same theme appears
in Gilmore & Black:
Maritime law . .. grew up and came of age under the tutelage of the civil
law, and it still bears the imprint thus acquired, even when administered in the
courts of common law countries. As the great national states arose in Europe,
the international law of the sea came to be assimilated into national law, or at
least to be restated as authoritative codifications; the classic one is the Ordonnance
de la Marine of Louis XIV.
GILMORE & BLACK, oP. cit. supra note 13, at 8, 9.
The impact of the Ordonnance was due in great part to the respect afforded the
French courts of that time. See generally, 4 BENEDICr, ADMIRALTY 355-58 (6th
ed. 1940).
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with jurisdiction over admiralty problems. These courts drew for
their substance upon customary sea law as then understood. x5 About
1350, however, greater notice was being taken of the Court of the
Admiral, a King's prerogative court consisting of a naval officer charged
with certain responsibilities concerning piracy and wrecking. 6 The
growth of prerogative admiralty courts was slow at first, but once
firmly established their jurisdiction began to conflict seriously with
that of the local maritime courts of the port towns, resulting in the
loss of revenue to them. By the year 1685, the powers of the Admiral's
Court had expanded greatly and were not unlike those later to be
codified in the Ordonnance de la Marine of Louis XIV.'T One provision of that code is deserving of particular notice at this point:
[The judges of admiralty] shall also take cognizance of the
damages done to the keys, banks, moles, palisadoes, and other
works cast up against the violence of the sea, and shall take care
that the depth of the ports and roads be preserved and kept clean.'
The similarity between this provision and that contained in the 1948
Act cannot pass without notice. Indeed, it is often referred to by its
supporters as authority. As support for "traditional" jurisdiction, however, the Ordonnance should be used cautiously. While the courts of
the Admiral did have jurisdiction of the type described in its early
days, it is interesting to note that this particular jurisdiction was
rejected by them prior to the enactment of the French code. Jurists
often tend to use the code as necessary to support a point, and reject
it when the language suggests a contrary result to that desired.' 9
During the reign of Richard II (1377-1400), pressures were
brought upon the King to return control of maritime affairs to the
coastal towns who were then beginning to feel the economic pinch.
One other likely reason would seem to be a degree of apprehension
on their part with regard to the exercise of the King's prerogative.
At any rate, the thrust of these pressures was directed at limiting
the jurisdiction of the Courts of the Admiral to cases involving those
15. 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY ov ENGLISH LAW 530-35 (3d ed. 1922).
16. 4 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 14, at 367-69.
17. L.I. tit. 2, art. 1-11 (1681).
18. English translation in 4 B8NtDICT, op. cit. supra note 14, at 356-57.
19. Consider as an example the language of Chief Justice Tilghman of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1806:
These ordinances, and the commentaries on them, have been received with great
respect, in the courts both of England and the United States; not as containing
any authority in themselves, but as evidence of the general marine law. Where
they are contradicted by judicial decisions in our own country, they are not to
be respected. But on points which have not been decided, they are worthy of
great consideration.
Morgan v. Insurance Co. of North America, 4 Dall. 455, 458 (Pa. 1806).
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things "done upon the sea." 20 The efforts were more or less successful,
and this pronouncement of jurisdictional limits, coupled with the use
of the common law writ of prohibition, was a powerful ally to the
common law courts in this battle. Henceforth, the admiralty was
carefully confined to cases of contracts or torts actually terminated
upon the high seas, or so closely related thereto as to amount to the
same thing. 2 In the American colonies, the Courts of the Vice Admiral fared better. The Crown was well aware of the advantages of
having a prerogative court in the outreaches of the empire, and, at
the same time, such courts were too far flung to disturb the equilibrium
of the trade centers in the coastal towns of England.2 2 The commissions granted to such Vice Admirals were quite broad, encompassing
everything done upon the sea or public streams, fresh waters, ports
and creeks within the ebb and flow of the tide from the first bridges
toward the sea.28 Just how much influence these commissions had on
later treatment of admiralty jurisdiction in this country is quite speculative. During the period between the Declaration of Independence and
the Constitutional Convention the picture is considerably confused.
During this period of some thirteen years no federal form of judiciary
existed, and a decentralization appears to have taken place which tended
to destroy any uniform pattern which might formerly have been
spawned. Each political unit was free to create the kind of maritime
law it pleased, or, indeed, none at all.24 It was obvious, therefore,
when the delegates came together in convention in 1787, that diversity
in the control of maritime affairs was not effective, and what was
really needed was a kind of federal jurisdiction that would create
the proper atmosphere for the growth of a strong and effective maritime industrial complex.
Against this complicated backdrop, then, Article III of the Constitution was drafted, bestowing admiralty jurisdiction upon the federal
20. This is the statutory standard of 13 Rich.

II, c. 5 (1389).

21. By the time of the American revolution, the King's courts bad been reduced
to handling the following kinds of problems: (1) enforcement of foreign judgments
where the person or goods were within reach of the court; (2) suits for mariner's
wages (where the contract was not under seal) ; (3) bottomry; (4) salvage, if the
property was not cast ashore; (5) cases of disputes between port owners regarding
the employment of a vessel; (6) collisions and injuries occurring upon the high seas;
and, (7) droits of the admiralty. 4 B5NMDICT, op. cit. supra note 14, at 398-99.
22. See De Lovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, 442 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
23. See, for example, the commission granted to Lord Cornbury as Vice Admiral
in 1701. 4 BENIPDcT, op. cit. supra note 14, at 409-19.
24. Pennsylvania, by Act of March, 1780, amending its act of 1778, decreed that
its judges should "hold a Court of Admiralty, and therein have cognizance of all
controversies, suits and pleas of maritime jurisdiction, not cognizable at common law."
Virginia gave its courts jurisdiction equivalent to that held by the English courts
prior to the Statute of Richard. Rhode Island adopted the Laws of Oleron. By 1778,
maritime courts in one form or another, exercising widely differing functions, were
in operation in all thirteen states. 4 BSNEDICT, op. cit. supra note 14, at 439-41.
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judiciary to hear all cases of admiralty and maritime flavor. While
this was a new jurisdiction in the sense that it was inapposite to the
individualized approach of the colonies, its exact content had meaning
only in the reflected light of prior history. But what history, in which
country, at what point of time? If we are to accept that the convention
intended traditional maritime jurisdiction, then the lack of definition
coupled with the hotchpot of prior history would seem to suggest that
what was intended was not the jurisdiction of a particular point, but
rather the general concepts of maritime law in existence and common
acceptance in the maritime nations of the world. If the founding
fathers gave any direct thought along this line, it is well hidden, for
little passed their lips upon the convention floor. 25 There are indications, however, that the feeling of the time ran strongly in favor of
a universal approach to admiralty, as reflected in the following excerpt
from the Federalist:
The most bigoted idolizers of state authority have not thus far
shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizance
of maritime causes. These so generally depend on the laws of
nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they
fall within the considerations relative to the public peace.26
While setting the tone, this expression of general sentiment did little
to aid in analysis of the grant of power; thus the chonicles of the first
fifty years of admiralty in the United States are crammed with instances
reflecting the steady press for greater definition. Early opponents of
a strong federal judiciary did their best to constrain admiralty within
those limits associated with the English courts at their lowest ebb.
With no firm guidelines to point the way, it can be said that there
certainly was room for their argument. Had it been adopted, of course,
the 1948 Act would have clearly been made impossible.
In 1789, the Congress enacted the first Judiciary Act, and rather
than clarifying the problem, only served to intensify it. Section 9 of
that Act stated:
25. The reports of the convention as given in FARRAND, RECORDS OV THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (1911) reveal little. It is not possible to conclude, however,
that nothing was said with regard to this issue for it is not entirely clear that these
records are complete.

26. The Federalist, No. 80, at 590-91 (J.C. Hamilton ed. 1864). Consider also
Governor Randolph's address to the Virginia Constitutional Convention:
Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction cannot, with propriety, be vested
in particular state courts. As our national tranquility and reputation, and intercourse with foreign powers may be affected by admiralty decisions; as they ought
therefore, to be uniform; and as there can be no uniformity if there be thirteen
distinct jurisdictions, - this jurisdiction ought to be in the federal judiciary. . ..
3 ELLIOTT'S DEBATES 571 (1788).
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The district courts .. .shall also have exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
.. . saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law
remedy, where the common law is competent to give it. [Emphasis
2 7
added. ]
The language used, as emphasized above, is the same as for the constitutional grant. Clearly, the question was now whether the content was
the same, or something different.
IV.
STEPS TOWARD FURTHER

DEFINITION

Because the amphibious tort problem raised by The Plymouth
and dealt with in the 1948 Act is a geo-jurisdictional problem, it is
somewhat helpful to compare other areas which centered upon geographical limitations upon jurisdiction, particularly the "tidal" concept. The English theory was that a tort, to be within the reach of
admiralty, must take place within waters affected by the rise and fall
of the tide." While this particular problem relates to the nature of
the waters upon which the admiralty might exert influence rather
than the nature of the cause of action itself, it is useful in demonstrating
the thinking of the early periods of American development with regard
to the scope of admiralty matters.
In these early and tentative gropings, there is to be found a
discernible appreciation for the distinctions to be drawn between the
problems of an island maritime nation with its commerce restricted
by and large to the fringes of its land, and those of a large nation,
continental in size, abounding with great inland rivers and lakes without
identifiable or significant tides. This appreciation can be seen in the
classic case of De Lovio v. Boit29 in which Mr. Justice Story suggested
that admiralty jurisdiction, whatever its precise nature, "comprehends
all maritime contracts, torts and injuries. That latter branch," he
emphasized, "is necessarily bounded by locality; the former extends
over all contracts ... which relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea. . . ."" Clearly this opinion did not spell out the
limits of power, but it was progressive in point of time. It accomplished
27. 1 Stat. 73, 76-77. This provision appears in revised form in 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(1958), but the interpretation given by the courts is the same. See Madruga v.
Superior Court of Cal., 346 U.S. 556, 560 n.12 (1954).
28. For a thorough discussion of English theory of jurisdiction, though couched
in terms of bottomry contracts rather than torts, read the explanation by Mr. Justice
Story in De Lovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
29. Ibid.
30. Id. at 444.
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two things: (1) it set the stage for the locality rule of tort jurisdiction and (2) made it clear that whatever the scope of admiralty jurisdiction, it was not to be limited to those things "done upon the sea."
Ten years later the steamboat Thomas Jefferson departed Shippingsport, Kentucky, on the first steamboat ascent of the Missouri,
carrying supplies for the exploratory Yellowstone expedition. The
venture proved so financially disastrous that upon the vessel's return
there was not enough money to pay the crew. When the resulting
libel reached Mr. Justice Story, he struck it down with a four-paragraph
opinion that cited no authority.," He was simply unable to find any
precedent regarding any incident beyond the reach of the rise and fall
of the tide which would justify libellant's position. The reversion
to a more restrictive view of jurisdiction was indeed surprising after
the promise of De Lovio. 2 It could be that the famous jurist suffered
a temporary lapse of insight, but the answer is more likely to be found
in the extrinsic pressures in action at the time. Already decided in
favor of expanded federal power were such landmarks as Osborn v.
Bank of the United States3 and McCulloch v. Maryland,4 and it is
just conceivable that the financial and economic pressure for this particular kind of expansion was not strong enough to justify the Court's
incurring further wrath from still strong state's rights advocates.
In any event, the tidal limitation was firmly in operation and
continued so until 1845, by which time the economic climate had
warmed considerably. Nearly half of the steamboat tonnage of the
United States was to be found upon the western rivers, 35 not to mention that upon the Great Lakes. Because these areas of commerce
were non-tidal, a large portion of those who dealt with shipping were
denied the beneficial use of the maritime lien. Congress, responding
to the growing hue and cry to which the Supreme Court seemed oblivious, provided litigants with the maritime lien in a statute very
carefully titled "An Act extending the jurisdiction of the district courts
to certain cases (1) upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting
the same."3 6 There was nowhere any reference to "admiralty" or
31. The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
32. Mr. Justice Story's stand in The Thomas Jefferson becomes even harder
to understand if it is viewed in the light of some of his later writings, such as:
This grant in the Constitution, extending the judicial power 'to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,' is not limited to, nor interpreted by, what
were cases of admiralty jurisdiction in England, when the constitution of the
United States was adopted, but extends the power, so as to cover every expansion
of such jurisdiction.
2 STORY, THE CONSTITUTION 449 (3d ed. 1858).
33. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
34. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
35. HUNTER, STEAMBOATS ON THE WESTERN RIVERS 33 (1949).
36. 5 Stat. 726 (1845), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1958).
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"maritime" in this act. Congress apparently had no intention of expanding upon the judiciary act but rather to bestow an "admiralty-like"
jurisdiction upon the federal courts under the auspices of the Commerce
Clause. 7 We are, unfortunately, not well appraised of the congressional
feelings in this matter. We are not clearly told whether this particular
solution was selected because there was no room left for further expansion within the confines of the judiciary act.
We do know, however, that the enactment of that statute spawned
a new series of opinions. In Waring v. Clarke,"" the Court held that
a collision which occurred some 95 miles up the Mississippi from New
Orleans was "within the ebb and flow of the tides" even though at
that point the only way any tide was discernible was to note a slight
slowing of the current at the time of flood tide. 9
The solution to the tidal problem was reserved for the case of The
Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, ° in which a vessel had rammed and sunk the
schooner Cuba on Lake Erie. The defense to the libel was lack of jurisdiction placing the 1845 Act squarely into issue. Mr. Justice Taney
rejected the commerce clause as adequate support for the jurisdiction
claimed, 4 ' but he did not dismiss the action. It was his opinion that the
1845 Act might still be sustained because in reality it drew its power
from Article III. The analogy of the tidal problem to the Extension
37. Only two years later, Daniel Webster, while arguing his case, criticized the
use of the commerce clause as a source of admiralty jurisdiction:
The only objection to this necessary law seems to be, that Congress in passing
it, was shivering and trembling under the apprehension of what might be
the ultimate consequence of the decision of this court in the case of the Thomas
Jefferson. It pitched the power upon a wrong location. Its proper home was
in the admiralty and maritime grant, as in all reason, and in the common sense
of all mankind out of England, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ought to
extend, or does extend, to all navigable waters, fresh or salt.
New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 378 (1847).
38. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847).
39. The Waring trend was reinforced by New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344 (1847). While the tidal concept was not rejected
it was weakened.
40. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). There was initial uncertainty as to the scope
of the holding. But in Fretz v. Bull, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 466 (1851), the Court held
that admiralty jurisdiction reached collisions on the Mississippi on the authority of the
"Chief". Jurisdiction was found on canals in Ex Parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1883).
Three more cases, Jackson v. The Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296 (1858); The
Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 555 (1867) ; and The Eagle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 15
(1869), already decided, combined to make clear that the tidal concept in the United
States was truly dead. The Hine v. Trevor, supra, is also noted for its interpretation
of the "saving to suitors" clause. For more on that subject, see SPRAGUE, THE
EXTENSION OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION LAW, A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 294 (1937).
41. Following the Genesee Chief there was a period of some confusion over the
precise role, if any, to be played by the commerce clause. There was a feeling by
part of the Court that while the clause was not proper support for the substance
of admiralty law, it still, by some mysterious emanation, had bearing upon the scope
of jurisdiction. See, e.g., New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 47 U.S.
(6 How.) 244 (1847) ; Jackson v. The Magnolia 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296 (1858);
Allen v. Newberry, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 244 (1839). It was not until The Belfast,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624 (1869), that it was agreed that the admiralty power was not
to be circumscribed by the scope of that clause.
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Act of 1948 must be noticed. In deciding the Genesee Chief, the Court
told the bar that there was yet room within the constitutional grant
of jurisdiction to add this new jurisdiction to that already announced
in the judiciary act. Now the question becomes one of deciding whether
history has repeated itself in providing a new jurisdiction within the
scope of Article III, or has the legislature exceeded the limit this time?
V.
SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF THE AMPHIBIOUS

TORT PROBLEM

Like the tidal problem, discussed above, the amphibious tort deals
with geographical restrictions, but in a slightly different sense. The
question posed by The Plymouth,4 2 in 1866, was: does the admiralty
grant include the banks of navigable waters. There are two approaches

to such a question, of course. One is to say that it is within the constitutional grant, but specific jurisdiction had not been provided for
by statute. The other is to take the position that it is outside traditionally recognized powers. The Court did not make its position clear,
stating that while every tort upon navigable waters was of admiralty
cognizance, a tort commencing there but consummated upon the shore
was not. In The Plymouth, sparks from a vessel called the Falcon
set fire to a wharf. When foreign attachment was brought against a
sister vessel, the Court found the locus of the tort to be ashore where
the "substance and consummation of the injury" had occurred; thus
there was no jurisdiction."' Exceptions were subsequently to be carved

out of this rule, to be sure, but usually by the use of artificial devices.
Where, for example, a vessel collided with a navigational beacon in
the Mobile ship channel, the Court avoided the Plymouth rule by finding that the tort had been consummated at a point "which is only
'
technically land, through a connection at the bottom of the sea."44
42. 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20 (1866).

43. Following the Plymouth decision, the courts refused to take jurisdiction of

cases involving damage by a vessel to houses on shore, Ex Porte Phoenix Ins. Co.,
118 U.S. 610 (1886); contents of a dockside warehouse, Johnson v. Chicago & Pac.
Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388 (1886) ; piers, wharves, docks, and property or persons
thereon, Cleveland Terminal R.R. Co. v. Cleveland S.S. Co., 208 U.S. 316 (1908),
The Mary Garrett, 63 Fed. 1009 (N.D. Cal. 1894), The Mary Stewart, 10 Fed. 137
(E.D. Va. 1881) ; bridges: The Troy, 208 U.S. 321 (1908) ; The Rock Island Bridge,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 213 (1867) ; The John C. Sweeney 55 Fed. 540 (E.D.S.C. 1893) ;
City of Milwaukee v. Curtis, 37 Fed. 705 (E.D. Wis. 1A89), and many other structures,
parts or extensions of the shore. The Poughkeepsie, 162 Fed. 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1908),
aff'd, 212 U.S. 558 (1908) (surface part of borings made to locate aqueduct); The
Haxby, 95 Fed. 170 (E.D. Pa. 1899) (goods thrown from wharf by impact of collision) ; The Professor Morse, 23 Fed. 803 (D.N.J. 1885) (a marine railway, the
upper end of which was attached to shore) ; The Maud Webster, Fed. Cas. No. 9302
(S.D. N.Y. 1877) (a derrick used in erecting a lighthouse pier).
44. The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361, 367 (1904).
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While owners of shore structures were thus ejected from admiralty,
ship owners in similar situations were not. Admiralty would take
jurisdiction, for example, if a ship was damaged by pilings unlawfully
placed in navigable waters, 45 or telephone wires negligently strung, 46
or by a negligently operated drawbridge47 or defective wharf. 48 This
kind of line-drawing at the river bank in favor of the shipowner was
awkward, inequitable, annoying and expensive to otherwise deserving
litigants. Because of these imbalances pressure was brought to bear
by commentators 49 and the interested bar 50 for reform.
VI.
THE FORM OF RELIEF OBTAINED

Action was first taken in 1930 when the American Association
of Port Authorities suggested that the American Bar Association
sponsor a bill designed to extend jurisdiction over amphibious torts.5
The ABA assigned the problem to a committee for study, but the
issues were not to be quickly or easily resolved. In its first pertinent
report, the committee took the strong position that the authorities
"leave no doubt that the Congress has no authority to extend the
52
Admiralty jurisdiction beyond torts committed on navigable waters."
In the 1931 report of the same committee it was stated: "Admiralty
jurisdiction does not and cannot be made to extend to land structures,
even by act of Congress, for the court has stated that the Congress
cannot enlarge the constitutional grant of power."53 As an alternative,
the committee offered a statutory draft intended to provide non-mari-

time liens upon vessels so involved.
This position remained essentially unchanged until 1933 when two
things happened to alter the perspective. First, Mr. George R. Farnum,
dissenting member of the committee in 1930 and 1931, published an
45. Phila., W.&V. R.R. v. Phila. & H. Towboat Co., 64 U.S. (23 How.)
209 (1859).
46. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Burke, 62 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1933).
47. Dorrington v. Detroit, 223 Fed. 232 (6th Cir. 1915).
48. Leonard v. Decker, 22 Fed. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1884).
49. The following are examples: ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 50 n.121; 1 BPNEDICT,
ADMIRALTY 353 n.9 (6th ed. 1940); Brown, Jurisdiction of the Admiralty in Cases
of Tort, 9 COLUm. L. REv. 1 (1909) ; Farnum, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Amphibious
Torts, 43 YALE L.J. 34 (1933) ; Note, 42 HARV. L. Rrv. 563 (1929).
50. See, e.g., the letter of Mr. George C. Sprague, Chairman of the Standing
Committee on Admiralty of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York dated
January 1939, addressed to Senator Robert F. Wagner: "As far as I can learn all of
the interested bar associations are now in agreement that a bill in the above form
should be enacted ..
" See also the material in this article, infra, on the program of
the American Bar Association in 1935.
51. 55 A.B.A. REP. 303 (1930).
52. Id. at 307.
53. 56 A.B.A. REP. 311, 314 (1931).
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article attacking the majority position. 4 As a result of that article,
the committee voted to reconsider its position, but still concluded that
it could not reverse its previous stand without the "most careful study
and consideration." 5 While such a study was being undertaken the
second, and deciding factor, came into play. The Supreme Court,
on November 5, 1934, decided5 6 that admiralty jurisdiction extended
to ship mortgage foreclosures which had previously been declared outside the cognizance of federal admiralty courts. Reference will be made
to this case later, but it is appropriate at this stage to note the impact
of the decision upon the deliberations of the ABA committee. In 1935,
the committee said:
. . .the prospect of the Supreme Court sustaining the constitutionality of an act of Congress as herein proposed, is much more
favorable at the present time than when the report of the 1931
Committee was submitted ....57
After five years of hesitation, the Association voted approval of the
proposed amphibious tort legislation.
Following ABA approval, S. 680 was introduced by Senator
Copeland at the Association's request. The bill was referred to committee where opposition was found to the inclusion of injuries to the
person within its scope. Because of such opposition, the bill was
shelved pending a report from the Maritime Commission.
In the
early part of 1938, the Commission filed a report with the Senate
Committee on Commerce recommending the passage of the bill59 and
all major bar associations having an interest in the matter rallied
'round the flag. In its 1943 report,6 ° however, the ABA Committee
on Admiralty and Maritime Law made reference to its continuing
difficulty in having the desired legislation introduced. This hesitation
on the part of the Congress appeared to be, at least in part, still due
54. He said: "Any argument of unconstitutionality comes down to little more in
substance than that, by tradition, logic and precedent, the subject-matter is definitely
excluded from an artificial and arbitrary legal category." Farnum, Admiralty Jurisdiction and Amphibious Torts, 43 YALE L.J. 34, 35 (1933). Compare this additional
language from the same article with the philosophy of Carl B. Swisher, supra note 9:
[T]here is every reason, if the law is to find its justification in the measure in
which it satisfies business needs and promotes public convenience and equity, to
bring this field of wrongs within the cognizance of the admiralty courts.
Id. at 36, 37.
55. 59 A.B.A. RtP. 397, 399 (1934).
56. Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934).
57. 60 A.B.A. Rtp. 411, 414 (1935).
58. On April 26, 1937, the late Mr. Kennedy introduced H.R. 6658, which
differed from S. 680 in that it omitted the words "persons and" in an attempt to
avoid problems created by the Senate version. Thus amended it drew the approval of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the Maritime Law Association of the United States. 63 A.B.A. RZP. 210 (1938).
59. 64 A.B.A. RtP. 167 (1939).

60. 68 A.B.A. R1P. 189-95 (1943).
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to doubts with regard to the inclusion of jurisdiction of personal
injury claims within the overall scheme."' By 1947 these doubts seem
to have been resolved, and on March 8, 1948, the bill was reported.
Both House and Senate reports6 2 placed major reliance upon the
opinions of the Navy Department, the Maritime Commission, and the
Department of Justice, all of which took the position that the bill
did not create a new cause of action but was a directive to the courts
to exercise that jurisdiction already conferred by Article III.
VII.
THE FIRST TEST -

PROPERTY DAMAGE

In 1951 the district court for the Eastern District of New York
was the first to hear a challenge of the Act upon constitutional
grounds." The tugboat Gloria 0 had collided with a bridge and was
libelled in rem. An action in personam was brought against the
owners, as well, under section 740 of the Extension Act. Respondent's
position that the Congress had exceeded the limitations of Article 111,
section 2 of the Constitution brought the validity of that statute directly
into issue. The court held that restriction of owners of the bridge
to their common law remedies "merely because of the incidence of the
damage said to have resulted from the character of the tug's handling,
would seem to be strained and artificial .. ."" In language reminiscent of the De Lovio case, Judge Byers said that he was
61. The 1943 report, in speaking of objections voiced by the Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Judiciary, said:
The objections in question were summarized by the Clerk of the Committee in
a letter to Mr. Hickox in this manner:
2. Inclusion of 'person' would enhance the question of constitutionality. Our
right to legislate is limited to maritime matters. Inclusion of 'persons' might also
compound benefits. Recovery under this bill might be added to the compensation
under the Longshoremen's Compensation Act.
Id.at 193.
62. H.R. R9P. No. 1523, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); S. Rep. No. 1593, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). In a letter from Acting Secretary of the Navy, W. John
Kenney, we find the following typical expression of view:
Adoption of the bill will not create new causes of action. It merely specifically
directs the courts to exercise the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States already conferred by article III, section 2 of the Constitution and already
authorized by the Judiciary Acts. H.R. REP. No. 1523, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
See also the views expressed in similar letters from W. W. Smith, then chairman of
the Maritime Commission, and Ass't Att'y Gen. Douglas W. McGregor, speaking for
the Justice Department.
63. American Bridge Co. v. The Gloria 0, 98 F. Supp. 71 (E.D.N.Y. 1951).
Earlier cases dealing with the statute restricted discussion to problems of interpretation of mechanical details, such as whether the statute could be applied retroactively,
All America Cables & Radio v. The Dieppe, 93 F. Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), the
meaning of "caused by a vessel," Hovland v. Fearnley & Eger, 110 F. Supp. 657 (E.D.
Pa. 1952), and whether statutory conditions precedent to suit had been complied with,
Clark Terminals v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 59 (D. Mass. 1951).
64. 98 F. Supp. at 74.
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. . unable to find any decision, nor have counsel cited any, in
which an Act of Congress, adopted pursuant to the quoted part
of Art. III, Sec. 2, has been held invalid as transcending constitutional power thereby imparted."5
*

The Gloria 0 relied for much of its strength upon a panoramic view
of prior legislative extensions in admiralty. One of these, the Ship
Mortgage Act of 1920, " was of doubtful utility. The Limited Liability Act of 1884,8 designed to protect the shipowner from total
financial ruin in the event of a maritime disaster, was also relied upon.
This latter act would seem to have more bearing upon the amphibious
tort problem. It was tested and upheld in Richardson v. Harmon,6 9
which decided that the protection afforded by the Act extended to nonmaritime as well as to maritime torts. On its face it would appear
that if the jurisdiction of the admiralty court can extend to the determination of the limitation to be placed upon the amount of damages
in a non-maritime tort case, it must also extend to include a determination of the liability giving rise to the need for such limitation. That
rationale, of course, ignores the practice of treating liability as a divisible problem in collision cases calling for separate actions for determination of the two issues. Be that as it may, the custom of referring
for support to legislative enactments and their tests in analogous areas
leaves one with the feeling that he is being boot-strapped to death.
The question of constitutionality was raised again in 1953 when
a tug collided with a government-owned dike and was libelled. 70 The
approach taken by the court in this case was to sustain jurisdiction
as being consistent with the conceptions of admiralty generally recognized and understood in the law of sea-going nations. Judge Stevens
drew upon English and French history to illustrate that it would be
strange indeed to argue that Congress had not the power to give
65. Id. at 73.
66. 41 Stat. 1000, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-894 (1958).
67. Prior to the passage of the Mortgage Act, it was believed that admiralty had

no jurisdiction over actions to foreclose mortgages on vessels. The Act extended jurisdiction to this critical area because of the intimate relation that financial security
has with trade and commerce, and, as in the problem under discussion, the need for
legislative relief. The Act was tested in The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934),
and upheld. Mr. Justice Hughes relied upon past extensions of jurisdiction for his

support, but did not analyze them with care.

Judge Byers, in the Gloria 0 suggested that it would be sheer temerity to refute
the logic of the Barium opinion. Even if true, the suitability of that case as precedent
for amphibious tort problems is open to doubt. The Mortgage Act deals with consensual transactions. As early as De Lovio the courts recognized that jurisdiction
over consensual transactions is measured by the nature of the transaction rather than
the locality of its execution.
68. 23 Stat. 57, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 183-89 (1958).
69. 222 U.S. 96 (1911).
70. United States v. Matson Nav. Co., 201 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1953). An earlier
attempt to construe a dike as an aid to navigation within the rule of The Blackheath
was not successful. The Panoil, 266 U.S. 433 (1925).
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United States Courts the same broad jurisdiction as enjoyed by courts
of those nations. While arguments may rage whether history does
in fact warrant the claimed extension, Judge Stevens' approach is
generally more persuasive than that utilized by Judge Byers in the
Gloria 0.
In view of this judicial atmosphere, it seems that there is little
reason to expect that the Supreme Court would disappoint the expectations of the ABA Committee in 1935, at least so far as property
damage cases are concerned. One cannot help but be still somewhat
disturbed, however, by the facts that (a) for eighty years the Supreme
Court could not seem to locate this reservoir of power, and (b) that
the result is once again to give different content to two identically
worded grants.
VIII.
THE MORE SEVERE TEST -

INJURY TO THE PERSON

Complications arising from personal injuries sustained in an amphibious tort situation were first dealt with in 1950 in the case of
Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic. 7' The injured party was
a longshoreman hired to load a vessel. Prior to leaving work for the
day, the libellant was instructed to replace a hatch cover which had
been stored upon the dock. As the cover was being hoisted aboard
by ship's gear, one end dropped, striking libellant as he stood upon
the dock, resulting in the amputation of one of his legs below the knee.
Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the court, ruled that the district
court sitting in admiralty had jurisdiction over the injury. Interestingly, there is no indication that the solution rested upon the power
granted by section 740; rather, Judge Hand relied upon his conviction
that the court had direct and inherent power under Article III and
the judiciary act apart and distinct from that granted by the 1948
statute - a position in keeping with that of the Navy Department
and others.7"
The line of thought in Strika weaves a rather tenuous but interesting pattern. Judge Hand begins his analysis with O'Donnell v. Great
Lakes Dredge and Dock Co., 73 in which the Supreme Court had ruled

that the Jones Act74 applied to a seaman injured ashore if he was
injured while engaged in the pursuit of his occupation. O'Donnell was
71. 185 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1950).
72. Statement of W. John Kenney, supra note 62.

73. 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
74. 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).
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silent with regard to the rights of a longshoreman injured ashore, reserving that problem until it might subsequently arise. It did arise,
however, two years later in Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc.75 when a
longshoreman sued his employer under the Jones Act for injuries
incurred by him while he was engaged in his duties ashore. The court
held, however, that in view of the fact that the exclusive remedy of a
longshoreman against his employer was compensation under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 76 he could not

claim under the Jones Act, which was traditionally reserved for the use
of seamen. Judge Hand inferred very properly that the reason that the
longshoreman was precluded was because of the bar of the Longshoremen's Act. But he then concluded that absent that Act there would have
been nothing in Swanson to prevent him from recovering against some
third party, such as the shipowner. While it is obvious that that Act has
nothing to do with the longshoreman-shipowner relationship, adherence
to this view is tantamount to a declaration that the longshoreman is
to be treated the same as a seaman for all purposes of admiralty
jurisdiction. The closest the courts have come to that position is to
hold that a longshoreman may recover for injuries incurred while
actually working aboard ship, since a seaman could recover in the
same instance.7" But there is a traditional distinction between the
longshoreman aboard ship and his counterpart ashore.
By manipulation of O'Donnell and Swanson, Judge Hand blurred
two basically distinct problems: (1) injury of a longshoreman engaged
aboard a vessel and (2) a seaman engaged in duties ashore. The
seaman has always been viewed as a ward of admiralty, and thus the
protection of that court has always followed him.7 8 The same type
of protection has been afforded the longshoreman aboard ship because
at such time he is acting like a seaman and for the moment performing
similar duties. When he goes ashore he is no longer acting as a seaman,
nor is he under any traditional protective wing. Judge Hand's efforts
to use Swanson to fill the gap between these two areas is simply not
effectual. Swanson is a poor piece of oakum with which to caulk such
a leaky jurisdictional seam. Absent the Longshoremen's Act there is
still a great deal, it would seem, to come between the injured worker
and a suit against the shipowner.
75. 328 U.S. 1 (1945).
76. 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (1958).
77. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
78. Language to this effect is often quoted from Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas.
480 (No. 6,047) (C.C.D. Me. 1823) and Reed v. Canfield, 20 Fed. Cas. 426 (No.
11,641) (C.C.D. Mass. 1832). For a latter-day exhibition of paternalism, see the case
of a messman who, while on shore leave, fell through the french doors of a dance hall.
Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951).
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The year 1961 brought with it another such case. In Fematt v.
City of Los Angeles,7" a California district court accepted the validity
of the 1948 Act on its face, insofar as any problem of property damage
might be involved, but questioned the constitutionality of the Act in
the personal injury area. Judge Kunzel analyzed the problem by reference to two fundamental sources of authority, concluding that the
extension which was challenged was proper. His first line of support
is the 1948 Act's legislative history which is limited to statements of
the executive branch with regard to the effect of the proposed legislation. Secondly, the judge placed a good deal of emphasis upon the
reasoning of the Matson case, particularly such language as ".

.

. in-

juries to shore structures by ships have long been recognized as maritime torts by the Continental Courts." 0 His decision apparently was
that the result of the legislative history and the provisions of the
Ordonnance of Louis XIV8 ' produced a vector which amply justified
the Matson rule.
Of some interest, but seldom referred to, is a case falling in point
of time between Strika and Fematt. In this case8" a longshoreman was
injured upon a dock due to a defect in the vessel's hoisting equipment.
The court, without analysis, concluded that the remedies of a longshoreman are restricted to those afforded by local law.88 We can
only speculate on the grounds for Judge Sobeloff's holding. In view
of Strika, the rejection of libellant's case would suggest either that
the court viewed the case as falling outside section 740, or, in the
alternative, that section 740 was invalid as applied to personal injuries.
In view of the facts of the case, it would be difficult to justify placing
the case outside the scope of section 740.
Ix.
SOME FINAL

OBSERVATIONS

It is quite easy to sit in the comfort of one's armchair and take
potshots, justified or not, at one or another Supreme Court doctrine.
In some cases it would seem required. The purpose of these concluding comments is not to criticize for the sake of creating an atmosphere
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

196 F. Supp. 89 (S.D. Cal. 1961).

Id. at 92.
Id. at 93.

American Export Lines, Inc. v. Revel, 266 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1959).
The jurisdictional question was disposed of negatively in two brief sentences:
Since Revel was injured while standing on the dock, (an extension of the land)
his remedies are restricted to those afforded by the local law. . . . This is true
even though the Congress has embraced such cases within the maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
Id. at 84.
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which might stimulate the Court to consider these problems. It has
indirectly done so already. In the recently decided case of Gutierrez v.
Waterman S.S. Corp.8 4 the court assumed the constitutionality of the
act without discussion, and passed on to more routine considerations.
The trend is, then, to find the Extension Act not only a useful tool, but
entirely valid as applied to both property damage and personal injury
cases although the justification for these decisions is muddled, confused,
and generally unpersuasive.
In the property area, such as dealt with in the Gloria 0 and Matson
cases, there is indeed much less reason to become involved with constitutional issues. Yet on a purely theoretical plane it is still disturbing to read the progeny of The Plymouth spanning a period of eight
decades and then to see the issue turn upon a few brief pages of
legislative history. There is a real possibility that The Plymouth was
improperly decided. Many commentators have suggested that conclusion."5 If so, however, it would seem neater to set it aside than
to strain the imagination by dreaming of ways to render that case
still vital since the 1948 Act. In addition to the desirable aspects of
such direct action, from a jurisprudential point of view, the Court
would have a grand chance to attempt to provide more meaningful
guidelines for future jurisdictional cases. However, the extension of
jurisdiction to include personal injury claims has distorted the picture.
There is no arguable or substantial support in history for the extension
of admiralty jurisdiction to these cases. The general law of maritime
nations, often touted, holds no key to the problem. The Ordonnance,
previously mentioned and so often called upon to do yeoman service,
makes reference to power respecting persons only with regard to
crimes"' and corpses,"7 and in neither instance is there any persuasive
analogy to the modern situation. If, as suggested by Fematt, the answer
is to be found in tradition and history, then it would seem that damage
is being done to the limits of Article III.
Aside from these constitutional difficulties, there are reasons on
other levels that render the application of the Extension Act to personal injury cases troublesome. As an example, it is entirely possible
that one result of these holdings might be to preclude a longshoreman
injured upon the dock from state-provided workmen's compensation
84. 373 U.S. 206 (1963).
85. For a good example, see Brown, Jurisdiction of the Admiralty in Cases of

Tort, 9 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1 (1909).

86. "[The judges] shall also take cognizance . . . of all crimes and offenses

committed upon the sea, its ports, harbors and shores."
4 BENEDICT, ADMIRALTY 356-57 (6th ed. 1940).

English translation in

87. "[The judges] shall take up the bodies of drowned persons, and shall draw
up a report of the condition of corpses found at sea and on the sand, or in the
ports ..
" English translation in 4 BENEDICt, op. cit. supra note 86.
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remedies because of the exclusiveness of admiralty law. The field may
simply be pre-empted. Because the Longshoremen's Act applies only
to injuries incurred upon the navigable waters of the United States, he
would not be able to receive compensation under that statute. The
result would be that he would be eligible for no form of compensation
under any compensation statute and be instead restricted to his remedies
by libel in admiralty. It was a very similar problem that the Longshoremen's Act was originally designed to overcome. The recent Calbeckas
decision has been cited as solving this problem, but in fact that decision
does very little to clarify the picture. In that case the Supreme Court
held that while employees engaged in the work of completing construction of a vessel afloat on the navigable waters might be compensated for
injuries under a state statute, that fact did not preclude the bringing of
an action under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. It is not clear just how far this case may be carried. If a broad
interpretation is adopted, it is possible that an injured longshoreman
might have a remedy under section 740 and at the same time preserve
his freedom to elect appropriate state compensation. But even if Calbeck
does operate in this fashion, it is difficult to understand how it can be
extended beyond those cases in which the injury occurred upon the
navigable waters. If the injury were incurred as in Strika, Revel,
Fematt, or Gutierrez, the longshoreman would be effectively barred
from compensatory relief. The Longshoremen's Act simply does not
reach him."9
Conceivably, another solution would be to extend the Longshoremen's Act coverage to the shore worker upon the dock, either by
additional legislation or judicial interpretation. But without legislation it would seem quite difficult to hold that the term "navigable
waters" includes not only the traditional areas, but also areas where
the impact of an amphibious tort might be felt. Calbeck provides no
firm guidelines for this kind of conjecture.
The so-called "tradition" of admiralty has been used and misused.
While at one time it is used to support the case for extension, it is at
another rejected because it leads to restrictive conclusions. It is interesting to note that many modern cases draw heavily upon such opinions
as that of Mr. Justice Wayne in Waring v. Clarke,"° yet this is the
very case that refused to discard the tidal concept.
On the other hand, if the practical problems created are not as
serious as those solved by the 1948 Act, then it would seem best to
88.
89.
United
90.

Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114 (1962).
The Act applies only to injuries "occurring upon the navigable waters of the
States." 44 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (1958).
46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847).
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recognize, frankly and honestly, that the Court was wrong in its
estimate of the scope of jurisdiction. As the situation rests, we are
left with no definitive statement of the extent of Article III. We are
not told whether there is even room for more expansion, and, if true,
in what direction it might extend. Most authorities fail to exhibit
any concern. One who does is Professor Herbert R. Baer:
Surely, in this day and age of social security of every kind, the
goal of the Court is in line with current political and social theory.
Within the 'grey' areas we might well applaud this humanitarian
action. However, when the Court rules contrary to congressional
mandates, redefines the functions of court and jury, and permits
jurors to classify as a seaman a person who obviously is not such
but who as a 'seaman' may recover more dollars than he would
be entitled to in his true capacity, one may well feel that our
Court has sailed too far off course.
on
The pot of gold at the end of the rainbow is not the star
91
which our Supreme Court Mariners should fix their sights.
In the same vein, the problem of providing the owner of a shore
structure adequate redress for damage resulting from an amphibious
accident could have been solved by other methods. The extension of
jurisdiction and liberalizing of judicial restraints, as Professor Baer
has so eloquently highlighted, has real merit in the areas of social
consciousness. No one will dispute the need, for example, in Civil
Rights litigation. But where, as the American Bar Association once
suggested, adequate protection might be provided legislatively by the
creation of an appropriate non-maritime lien, there seems little reason
to distort traditional concepts by making them appear favorable, as
though through rose-colored lenses in the more narrow context of
admiralty law. In order to adopt a more colorful phrasing, so as not to
be upstaged by Professor Baer, I might conclude that the increasing
tightening of the back-stay to make a ship ready for fairer winds might
well be putting too much tension upon the jurisdictional mast.
91.
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